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Work in the marketplace is the primary source of income for most households in
modern industrialized societies.  A permanent or even a long-term exit from work by a
household’s principal earner is therefore a potentially risky economic event.
1   Most
countries now have a mixture of private and public institutions to ameliorate the
economic consequences of such exits.   On the public side, most social insurance systems
provide income to those who exit work at older ages (retirement, survivor benefits) or at
younger ages because of health conditions (disability, workers’ compensation, and
survivor benefits).  Most countries also offer long-term unemployment benefits for
workers of all ages as part of their social insurance system.  In addition to these types of
social insurance programs, which target long-term labor market workers, most countries
also offer an array of means-tested welfare programs.  Such programs typically provide a
minimum social safety net for nonworkers that may either be categorical (e.g., aged,
disabled, lone parents, survivors, etc.) or universal in design.  (See Aarts, Burkhauser and
de Jong, 1998 for a fuller taxonomy of social welfare systems in a comparative context.)
While many studies of the economic consequences of long-term labor market
exits have focused on the ameliorative role of such government programs, private
institutions also play an important part in replacing lost earnings following an exit from
the labor market.  Certainly in the United States, but also in Canada, Great Britain, and in
other industrialized countries, private employer fringe benefit packages provide
protection following a labor force exit due to redundancy, disability, retirement or death.
Furthermore, some households can use income from their accumulated wealth, from the
added market work of other household members, or from life insurance settlements to
offset their principal earner’s lost income.
Studies, especially cross-national studies, of post-exit economic well-being often
focus on how a given program (e.g., social security retirement, disability, or survivor’s
insurance, unemployment insurance, etc.) replaces lost earnings.  By focusing on benefits
from a specific program, these studies attempt to gauge the potential post-exit income
available to the households of workers who experience long-term labor market exits.  The
lack of comparable data, however, often restricts cross-national studies to either a
comparison of a hypothetical average worker’s earnings history and that worker’s2
subsequent social security benefits across various countries or the use of cross-sectional
data from various countries to compare persons of a given age who are working relative
to those who are not.
2  (See Gruber and Wise, 1999 for an example of the former strategy
and many studies using the comparable cross-sectional data from the Luxembourg
Income Study for examples of the latter).
Cross-national comparisons using such data may be of limited value, especially
when their intent is to show the relative economic risk to a household of a worker’s long-
term labor market exit or death across industrial societies.   These limitations arise, first,
because the studies may fail to recognize variation in the importance of social security
insurance or any other government program in “income replacement” across countries
and second, because they are unable to trace changes in economic well-being across
actual households.
3
In this paper we take advantage of a newly expanded source of cross-national
panel data, the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF), which contains comparable
socio-economic information on households in four modern industrial societies (Canada,
Germany, Great Britain, and the United States).  We use these data to trace the economic
well-being of the households of men and women who exit the labor market.  For our
analysis of exits other than through death we examine the well-being of long-term
employed men who experienced a permanent or long-term exit from the labor market in
the 1990s.  We capture long-term exits in this population by requiring men to have three
consecutive years of employment (measured as at least 52 hours of market work for
which a worker is paid in a given year) followed by at least two years of non-employment
(measured as working less than 52 hours or having zero labor earnings in a given year).
4
In our analysis of the consequences of death on the economic well-being of survivors, we
expand our sample to include both those in and out of the labor force at the time of their
death.  Hence, we examine changes in the economic well-being of United States
households following the death of a head or spouse between 1976 and 1993, regardless of
their labor force status at the time of their death.3
Data
Researchers at Cornell University, along with colleagues from the German
Institute for Economic Research in Berlin, the Survey Research Center at the University
of Michigan, the Economic and Social Research Council Research Centre at the
University of Essex, and Statistics Canada in Ottawa, have developed and tested
algorithms that place information from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the
United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the British Household Panel
Study (BHPS) and the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) into a
framework of comparably defined variables for use in cross-national research.  The result
of these efforts is a longitudinal micro-database known as the Cross-National Equivalent
File (CNEF).  This file provides a set of constructed variables (e.g., net-of-tax household
income, estimates of annual taxes paid by respondents, a selection of household
equivalent weights based on equivalence scales, etc.) that are not immediately available
in the original surveys.  The CNEF data file currently contains data from 1980 to 1997
for the United States, from 1984 to 1998 for Germany, from 1990 to 1997 for Great
Britain and from 1993 to 1994 for Canada.
5  The CNEF data include standard
demographic information, household income and its components, and individual
information on employment and labor earnings.  The CNEF data file is updated annually
with additional years of the panels and newly created comparable variables.  (For a fuller
discussion of these data see Burkhauser, Butrica, Daly, and Lillard, 2000).
In this paper, we take full advantage of the panel nature of the CNEF data to first
estimate the age-specific risk of a long-term non-death labor market exits for men across
the four countries in the 1990s and then to trace the consequences of such exits on their
household income by source. To do so, we use an event history based longitudinal sample
design that allows us to examine the labor market activity and economic well-being of
men prior to and following a long-term labor market exit.  Applying our definition of
labor force exits, we collect a sample of 16,627 German, 8,602 British, 16,206 Canadian,
and 14,614 United States observations of men at risk of a labor market exit between the
ages of 25 through 75.
6  Each of these men experienced the beginning of a long-term
labor market exit sometime between 1990 and 1998.
7  We then use data from the United4
States to trace the consequences of the death of a head or spouse on the household
income of surviving household members.  To do so, we use an unbalanced panel of men
and women, age 25 and older, who died sometime between 1976 and 1993.
8
To measure changes in household economic well-being, we track all sources of
household income.  These sources include the labor earnings of the person who exits the
labor market or dies, the labor earnings of other household members, income from
employer-based pensions, other private sources, social insurance pensions, and other
public transfers, as well as estimates of household taxes.
9
Risk of Labor Market Exit By Age
Cross-sectional studies of employment compare the employment rate of random
samples of men of different ages in a given year and infer exit rates across age categories
or, in a more sophisticated manner, compare employment rates between matched age
cells of two consecutive yearly cross-sections.  Here we are able to follow the
employment behavior of the same men as they age.  Small sample sizes require us to pool
our sample of men by age across all years of the 1990s.  To do so we realign our calendar
year data into an event history framework where the event begins in the last year of
employment (t).  We then assign the age at survey interview year minus 1 as the age of
exit in year (t).
10  This approach allows us to estimate the risk of a worker experiencing a
long-term labor market exit at any given age.
11  The sample periods under study as a
possible last year of long-term employment are income years 1990 through 1997 for the
GSOEP, 1990 through 1996 for the PSID, 1990 through 1997 for the BHPS, and 1993
through 1998 for the SLID.
12
Figure 1 shows the pattern of long-term labor market exits for men aged 55 to
67.
13  Long-term age-specific exit rates vary substantially across ages and across
countries.  With few exceptions, long-term age-specific exit rates are highest in Germany
and lowest in the United States at all ages in Figure 1.  German exit rates exceed 10
percent as early as age 58 and rise rapidly to nearly 30 percent by age 61.  They approach
50 percent by age 64.  In contrast, United States exit rates do not hit 10 percent until age
60 and do not hit 30 percent until age 65.  British exit rates remain near 10 percent until
age 62 at which point they begin to rise, peaking at age 65.  Canadian exit rates reach 105
percent by age 59 and remain between 10 and 20 percent until they rise sharply at ages 64
and 65.
In the introduction of their edited volume, Gruber and Wise (1999) argue that
variations in social security program rules that cause age-specific social security wealth
values to vary across the life cycle may explain differences in retirement rates across
modern industrial societies.
14  The individual country authors in the Gruber and Wise
(1999) volume for the most part use simulated individual earning histories to demonstrate
a correlation between peak changes in social security wealth across life and age-specific
employment rates in their countries.  Our longitudinal results are consistent with this
point.  Social security wealth values peak at earlier ages in Germany than in Canada,
Great Britain and the United States.
15
Economic Well-Being Before and After Long-Term Labor Market Exit
Figure 1 demonstrates that long-term labor market exit rates vary greatly across
the life cycle and across our four countries.  We now use our panel data to focus on how
household income and its sources change as these men transition out of the workforce.
Because social insurance systems tend to provide more protection to those who exit at
older ages, we divide our country samples into three age groups defined by the worker’s
age at exit—younger workers (aged 25 through 49), middle-aged workers (aged 50
through 61), and older workers (aged 62 and over).  In so doing, we show the relative
importance of public and private sources of income and how important these sources are
in maintaining pre-exit household income levels.
Table 1 provides information on mean average net of tax household income (i.e.,
total gross household income minus all taxes) as well as by key sources of that income
for the two years before and after a labor market exit of men in our four countries in the
1990s.  By definition, own labor income falls to near zero in the two years following
labor market exit in all countries.
16
In the United States, decreases in the earnings of men who exit the labor force at
older ages are almost equally offset by increases in their household’s social security and
private pension income.  For men who exit at middle ages, increases in private pension6
income dominate.  At younger ages, increases in other public and private income
dominate.
In Germany, decreases in the labor earnings of men who exit at either older or
middle ages are primarily offset by increases in social security income, although
increases in other public income are also important at middle ages.  At younger ages,
increases in other public income dominate.
In Great Britain, decreases in the labor earnings of men who exit at older ages are
almost equally offset by increases in social security and other public and private income.
At middle ages, increases in private pension and other private and public income are most
important.  At younger ages, increases in other public and private income dominate.
In Canada, decreases in the labor earnings of men who exit at older ages are offset
by increases in social security and private pension income.  At middle ages, increases in
private pension income dominate.  At younger ages, increases in other public and private
income dominate.
Table 1 shows that the sources of household income that replace lost labor
earnings in the years immediately following a long-term exit from the labor market vary
both within a country, depending on age of exit, and across our four countries.  Social
security income plays an important role in replacing the lost earnings of men who exit the
labor market after age 61 in all countries, but it is far more important in Germany and
Great Britain than in the United States or Canada as a share of total post-government
household income.  Social security income plays much less of a role for men who exit the
labor force at middle ages.  Only in Germany does social security continue to play a
dominant role.  But other public transfer programs are important for men who exit at this
age, except in United States.  At younger ages, other public transfers dominate in all four
countries.  However, in the United States, increases in other public transfers are quite
small relative to the other countries.  This variation in the relative importance of sources
of post-exit income has important implication for interpreting various measures of
“replacement rate” across countries.
Table 2 shows the relative success of social security benefits (i.e., total household
post-exit social security benefits divided by pre-exit own labor earnings) and of private
pension benefits (i.e., total household post-exit private pension benefits divided by pre-7
exit own labor earnings) in replacing the labor earnings of men who exit the labor force at
various ages.  A social security earnings replacement measure is often used not only to
show how much social security income replaces a typical worker’s lost earnings in a
country but is also used to infer how much a household’s income is likely to fall
following a long-term labor market exit.  Table 2 shows that simple social security
replacement rates of this type substantially understate how much net-of-tax household
income is available following such an exit and does so disproportionately for the United
States and Canada.
The median German man who exits at age 62 and over has a social security
replacement rate of 55.8 percent, substantially more than the 35.0 percent social security
replacement rate for the median man who exits at those ages in the United States.
However, once all sources of income are included in a total income replacement rate
measure (net-of-tax household income prior to labor market exit to net-of-tax household
income following exit) the total replacement rate for the median German man is 76.9
percent and 52.2 percent for the median man in the United States.
In Canada, the difference between the social security (28.3 percent) and the total
replacement rate (84.2 percent) for the median man who exits the labor force at this age is
even greater.  Higher median private pension replacement rates explain part of this
difference across countries.  While the median total replacement rate in the United States
continues to be lower for men who exit at older ages than in the other countries, it is less
so than the replacement rate for social security, and surprisingly, it is Canada that has the
highest total replacement rate for the median man who exits at these older ages.  The
common expectation among researchers is that the European countries replace more
income post-retirement than do the United States or Canada. The gap between the median
social security earnings replacement rate and the median total replacement rate is even
greater for men who exit the labor force at younger ages.
In the United States, social security retirement benefits are only available for
those aged 62 and over.  Prior to age 62, social security benefits for men are primarily
available only for those eligible based on disability.
17  Hence, it is not surprising that the
median man exiting the labor market at middle and younger ages in the United States
receives no social security benefits.  The same is true for Canadian men.8
But this measure grossly understates post-exit household income for men who
exit at these ages.  Primarily because of greater access to private pension income, the
total replacement rate for the median man in the United States who exits at middle ages is
higher than that of the median man who exits when he is older.  The gap in replacement
rates across the four countries is smallest for those who exit at middle ages.  No social
security or private pension income is received by the median man who exits from long-
term work at younger ages in any of our four countries.  However, as we saw in Table 1,
other public income is available.  The median man who exits at younger ages in the
United States has the lowest total replacement rate among those in the four countries.
Household Economic Well-Being Before and After Death of the Head or Wife
We now turn to our analysis of the economic well-being of households following
the death of a head or spouse.  While we will extend this analysis to the other three
countries in our sample, we present results here only for the United States.  As in the
above analysis, we focus on how household income and its sources change across four
different age groups defined by the age at which the head or spouse died.  We use the
same 25-49 and 50-61 age groups as above but separate our oldest group into two sub-
groups, 62-69 and 70 and older, to capture outcomes of those who die while transitioning
into retirement and those who do so after they are out of the labor force.  We present our
results for the sample of households whose head or spouse die as well as for a subsample
of households of surviving widows.
Table 3 shows how mean household income and its sources vary from three years
before to three years after the death of a head or spouse within our four age categories.
Not surprisingly, the death of a head or spouse at age 25-49 has a dramatic impact on
household labor income.  In the year prior to death, mean household labor earnings are
$61,443 of which $27,399 is from the person who will die in the next year.  While the
survivor’s labor earnings and those of other household members increase in the year
following the death of a head or spouse, household labor earnings are on average only
$42,907 in the year after the death of a head or spouse.  This decline in household labor
earnings is offset to some degree by increases in other private sources of income and in9
social security income as well as by a decline in taxes paid, so that net of tax total
household income falls by a smaller percentage.
The death of a head or spouse aged 50-61 yields similar results.  Household labor
earnings fall even more precipitously from $48,507 in the year before to $27,236 in the
year after death of the head or spouse.  But increases in other private sources of income
and in social security income as well as a reduction in taxes paid on that income, mitigate
to a substantial degree the percentage decline in total net-of-tax household income.
The death of a head or spouse age 62-69 results in about the same percentage
decline in household labor income but a far smaller absolute decline since deaths at this
age occur when labor force participation has already declined substantially.  Private
transfers and social security income are a more important component of income both
before and after the death of a head or spouse.  This income remains at approximately the
same level over the period and hence reduces the relative drop in mean net-of-tax
household income caused by lost earnings.
The death of a head or spouse at age 70 and above is no longer important with
respect to labor earnings since few heads or spouses work at these ages.  Rather, other
private sources of income and social security income are the primary sources of
household income.  On average, the most important source of income is social security
and these benefits fall from $13,291 in the year prior to death to $8,477 in the year after
death.  This decline approximates the decline in a joint and two-thirds annuity payment to
the “traditional” household.
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In Appendix Table 2A we repeat this analysis for the subsample of households in
which the survivor is a widow.  The results follow the same pattern as discussed above
for the household’s of all survivors.
In Table 3 we compared the net-of-tax income of households before and after the
death of a head or spouse.  In so doing, we compared household income for households
of different sizes.  A large literature exists detailing the problems associated with
measuring economic well-being at the individual level (Moon and Smolensky, 1977;
Burkhauser, Smeeding, and Merz, 1996).  Among the most difficult issues is how to
compare the economic well-being of individuals who live in households of different
sizes.  One extreme is to assign a per capita share of household income to all household10
members.  This assignment assumes that income is equally shared by household members
and that there are no returns to scale in household production.  The other extreme is to
assign all household income to each household member.  This assignment assumes that
household income is a pure public good – that is, that access to or potential consumption
of household income by one household member does not diminish in any way the amount
of household income left to be consumed by other household members.  An alternative
interpretation would be that the household has perfect returns to scale in the production of
household goods and services purchased with household income.
The assumption one makes about the returns to scale in household production is a
particularly important issue when the comparison is of an event that by its very nature
changes household size.  If we simply compare net-of-tax total household income in
Table 3 before and after the death of a head or spouse, we are effectively assuming
perfect returns to scale.  Alternatively, we could assume there no returns to scale and
assign survivors a per capita share of net-of-tax household income.  Buhman, Rainwater,
Schmaus, and Smeeding (1988) propose a formula that accommodates these two extreme




where an individual’s equivalent income (E) equals total household income (D) divided
by household size (S) raised to the power (e).  The assumption one makes about
economies of scale in household production or consumption is captured in the value one
adopts for (e).  At one extreme, when (e) equals 1, no economies of scale exist.  Hence
total household income for households of two persons must be twice that of a one-person
household for each person in the two-person household to have the same level of
economic well-being as the person in the one-person household.  Operationally, per
capita income is assigned to each person in the household.
At the other extreme, when (e) equals zero, economies of scale are perfect, and
income can be thought of as a pure public good within the household.  Operationally,
each person is assigned equivalent income exactly equal to household income.  This
assumption is implicitly adopted in the comparisons of net-of-tax income shown in Table
3.11
Burkhauser et al. (1996) show the sensitivity of income inequality and poverty
measures to variations in the value of (e) but recognize that economic theory does not
suggest a particular value.  They point out, however, that a common value used in the
literature is (e) equal to 0.5 (Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding, 1995; Ruggles, 1990).
In Table 4, we use the above formula to adjust net-of-tax household income
values for period t-1 and t+1 shown in Table 3 for household size, using these three
values of e.  We explicitly label the resulting household size-adjusted values to indicate
which value of (e) we use.  Not surprisingly, individualized net-of-tax household income
falls the higher is the value of (e) but more important for our purpose, the ratio of mean
household size-adjusted net-of-tax income in t+1 to mean household size-adjusted net-of-
tax income in t-1 (after and before death) varies dramatically with the choice of (e).  In
Appendix Table 3A we repeat this analysis for the subsample of households in which the
survivor is a widow.
This variation can best be seen in Figure 2.  Here we first calculate, for each
household, the ratio of household size-adjusted net-of-tax income in t+1 to household
size-adjusted net-of-tax income in t-1.  We then find the median household’s ratio in the
sample for each age group.  Using a per capita scale (e=1), we find the economic well-
being of surviving household members rises, regardless of the age at which death
occurred.  On the other hand, when we assume perfect returns to scale (e=0), the
economic well-being of surviving household members falls.  The decline is larger at older
ages.  When a value of .5 is used, economic well-being of surviving household members
before and after the death of a head or spouse is approximately the same.
Figure 3 repeats the analysis for each age-at-death group using the median
replacement rate given by the household’s social security income in the year after the
death of the head or spouse divided by the deceased wages and household social security
benefits in the year before his or her death.  This ratio approximates the replacement rate
concept used in the simulations typically done to measure the degree to which social
security replaces lost earnings.  The median household who experience the death of a
head or spouse aged 25-49 or 50-61 had no social security income.  Hence this measure
greatly understates the actual income available after the death of a head or spouse.  The
median ratio for households whose head or spouse died between ages 62-69 follow the12
same pattern shown in Figure 2 but at somewhat lower levels.  The median ratio for
households whose head or spouse died at ages 70 and older also follow the same pattern
shown in Figure 2 but at about the same level.  In Appendix Figures 1A and 2A we repeat
this analysis for the households of surviving widows.  The results are similar.
Conclusions
Lack of comparable multi-period data has made it difficult to determine the
importance of social security and other sources of income in replacing the lost earnings of
men who exit the labor force at various ages.  Here we show that social security income
(i.e., income from public, industry-wide, insurance-based, retirement and disability
programs) is most important for men who exit at older ages in the four countries (Canada,
Germany, Great Britain, and the United States) we consider and less so for men who exit
at younger ages.  However, focusing solely on social security replacement rates would
not only overstate the actual decline in net-of-tax household income that occurs following
an exit from the labor market by men in all four countries but would disproportionately
do so for the United States and Canada.  Private pension income in the United States,
Canada, and Great Britain plays a much more important role in replacing the labor
earnings of men who exit at older ages than in Germany.
However, even using a net-of-tax household replacement rate measure, the
household of the average man exiting the labor force in the United States still has a
relatively lower replacement rate than does the average man in Canada, Great Britain, or
Germany at all ages.  The overall generosity of the set of retirement programs—social
security, other public programs, and private pensions—that provide such income to those
men who exit the labor force may in part explain the higher exit rates and lower
employment rates of men in these countries relative to the United States.
We find similar results when we focus on the economic well-being of survivors
following the death of a head or spouse.  Net-of-tax household income is in general
higher than would be implied by social security replacement rates.  The actual
replacement rate, however, is sensitive to assumption made about returns to scale.13
References
Aarts, Leo J.M., Richard V. Burkhauser, and Philip R. de Jong. “Convergence:  A
Comparison of European and United States Disability Policy.”  In Terry Thomason, John
Burton, and Douglas Hyatt (eds.), New Approaches to Disability in the Work Place.
IRRA Research Volume, (1998), pp. 299-338.
Atkinson, Anthony B., Lee Rainwater, and Timothy M. Smeeding. Income Distribution
in OECD Countries: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).  Paris:
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development.  (1995)
Blundell, Richard and Paul Johnson. “Pensions and Retirement in the United Kingdom.”
In Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise.  Social Security and Retirement around the
World.  The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, [DATE], pp. 403-436.
Borsch-Supan Axel and Reinold Schnabel, “Social Security and Retirement in Germany.”
In Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise. Social Security and Retirement around the
World.  The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, (1999), pp. 135-180.
Buhmann, Brigitte, Lee Rainwater, Guenther Schmaus, and Timothy M. Smeeding.
“Equivalence Scales, Well-being, Inequality, and Poverty: Sensitivity of Estimates
Across Ten Countries Using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.”  Review of
Income and Wealth (1988), 34(2), pp 115-142.
Burkhauser, Richard V., Barbara A. Butrica, Mary C. Daly, and Dean R. Lillard.  “The
Cross-National Equivalent File:  A Product of Comparative Research.”  (2000) Cornell
University Working paper. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University.
Burkhauser, Richard V., Timothy M. Smeeding, and Joachim Merz.  “Relative Inequality
and Poverty in Germany and the United States Using Alternative Equivalency Scales.”
Review of Income and Wealth (1996), 42(4), pp 381-400.
Diamond, Peter and Jonathan Gruber. 1999. “Social Security and Retirement in the
United States.”  In Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise. Social Security and Retirement
around the World.  The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, (1999) pp. 437-474.
Gruber, Jonathan.  “Social Security and Retirement in Canada.”   In Jonathan Gruber and
David A. Wise. Social Security and Retirement around the World.  The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, (1999), pp. 73-100.
Gruber, Jonathan and David A. Wise. “Introduction and Summary.” In Jonathan Gruber
and David A. Wise. Social Security and Retirement around the World.  The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, (1999), pp. 1-36.14
Lumsdaine, Robin L. and Olivia S. Mitchell.  “New Developments in the Economic
Analysis of Retirement.” In Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.). Handbook of
Labor Economics.  Volume 3C. Amsterdam:  Elsevier Science (1999), pp. 3261-3308.
Moon, Marilyn and Eugene Smolensky, eds.  Improving Measures of Economic Well-
being.  New York: Academic Press. (1977).
Quinn, Joseph F. and Richard V. Burkhauser.  “Retirement and Labor Force Behavior of
the Elderly.”  In Linda Martin and Samuel Preston (eds). Demography of Aging.
Washington, DC:  National Academy of Science (1994), pp. 50-101.
Quinn, Joseph F., Richard V. Burkhauser, and Daniel A. Myers.  Passing the Torch:  The
Influence of Economic Incentives on Work and Retirement.  Kalamazoo, MI:  W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research (1990).
Ruggles, Patricia.  Drawing the Line: Alternative Poverty Measures and Their
Implications for Public Policy.  Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press. (1990).15
Appendix
In this appendix we detail the components included in each of the broad income
categories described above.  Table 1A lists the components of income measured in each
country’s survey and how we’ve allocated them to our broad income categories.  More
detailed information about the income measures asked in each survey is available in each
survey’s file documentation.  We also provide, for each country, a brief overview of
government programs for which income is measured in the data we use.16
GOVERNMENT TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN CANADA1
This document describes government transfer programs in Canada, with government
transfers being defined to include traditional programs in which those meeting specific
conditions receive money as well as programs related to private retirement income plans.
Not included are programs providing non-refundable tax credits.  (Non-refundable tax
credits reduce the amount of income tax you owe. However, if the total of these credits is
more than the amount you owe, you will not get a refund for the difference.)  The
intention is to include federal and provincial programs, although the multitude of
provincial programs provides a major challenge to complete coverage.
Canada Child Tax Benefit
   Program description
The Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) is a tax-free monthly payment made to eligible
families to help them with the cost of raising children under age 18.  Included with the
CCTB is the National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS), a monthly benefit for low-
income families with children. The NCBS is the Government of Canada's contribution to
the National Child Benefit (NCB), a joint initiative of federal, provincial, and territorial
governments. As part of the NCB, certain provinces and territories also provide
complementary benefits and services for children in low-income families, such as child
benefits, earned income supplements, child care, supplementary health benefits, and early
prevention programs for children at risk.
•   Universal entitlement: Yes
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Old Age Security
 Program description
Old Age Security provides a monthly pension to most people over 65 who have lived in
Canada for at least ten years. The Old Age Security Program also provides other benefits
for low-income seniors, such as the Allowance, the Allowance for the survivor and the
Guaranteed Income Supplement. The basic Old Age Security pension is taxable income.
•   Universal entitlement: Yes
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
                                                          
1Prepared by Philip Giles of Statistics Canada.17
Guaranteed Income Supplement / Spouse’s Allowance / Survivor’s Allowance
 Program description
The Guaranteed Income Supplement provides additional money, on top of the Old Age
Security pension, to low-income seniors (i.e., aged 65 or more) living in Canada. To be
eligible for the Supplement, you must be receiving the Old Age Security pension and
meet certain income requirements (based on the combined income of the person and
spouse).
The Spouse’s Allowance provides money for low-income persons (aged 60 to 64) whose
spouse receives or is entitled to receive the Old Age Security pension and the Guaranteed
Income Supplement.
The Survivor’s Allowance provides money for low-income persons (aged 60 to 64)
whose spouse has died.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Social Assistance
 Program description
Social assistance covers many provincial and municipal income supplements to
individuals and families.  It is usually provided only after all other possible sources of
support have been exhausted.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Employment Insurance
 Program description
Regular benefits are paid to people who have lost their job and want to return to work. To
receive these benefits you must be actively looking for another job and be willing and
able to work at all times.
You can receive regular benefits if you lose your job through no fault of your own and
you can’t find work, provided you have paid into the EI account; you have been without
work and without pay for at least seven consecutive days; you have worked for the
required number of hours based on where you live and the unemployment rate in your
area.
Special benefits are paid to people who are unable to work due to illness, injury,
quarantine, pregnancy or to care for a newborn or adopted child, provided you have paid
into the EI account; and you have worked for the required number of hours. Fishing
benefits are paid to people who have lost their job and earned money in the fishing
industry (including self-employed fishers). To receive these benefits you must be actively
looking for another job and be willing and able to work at all times.18
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Worker’s Compensation
 Program description
The most common benefit is the replacement of earnings lost after a workplace illness or
injury, but other benefits are available.  To be eligible for benefits, a person must:
 Have a worker-employer relationship with an employer covered by the WSIB
(Workplace Safety Insurance Board)
  Have an injury or illness directly related to his/her work.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Canada / Quebec Pension Plan
 Program description
The Canada Pension Plan operates in every province and territory except Quebec which
has a similar program, the Quebec Pension Plan.  The Canada Pension Plan can provide
Canadians with a retirement pension as early as age 60. This Plan also offers disability,
survivors and death benefits. The amount of the pension or benefit depends on how much
and for how long a person contributes to the Canada Pension Plan. With very few
exceptions, every person in Canada over the age of 18 who earns a salary must pay into
it.
The Canada Pension Plan retirement pension is a monthly payment to people who have
contributed to the Canada Pension Plan or both Canada Pension Plan and Quebec Pension
Plan and live outside the province of Quebec and who are at least 60 years of age. The
pension is designed to replace about 25% of the earnings paid into the Plan.
This retirement pension would normally be payable the month after a person’s 65th
birthday. The amount of the pension is smaller if it is taken before that point, and larger if
taken after. This "flexible" retirement pension can be adjusted to age 60 at the earliest or
age 70 at the latest. To be eligible prior to age 65, a person must be considered to have
reduced or stopped working.
The Canada Pension Plan Disability pays a monthly benefit to people under age 65 who
have contributed to the Plan and who are disabled according to Canada Pension Plan
legislation. It also pays monthly benefits for their dependent children.
Canada Pension Plan survivor benefits are paid to a deceased contributor's estate,
surviving spouse or common-law partner and dependent children.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes19
Goods and Services Tax Credit
 Program description
The GST/HST credit (goods and services tax/harmonized sales tax) is a tax-free payment
to help individuals and families offset the cost of the GST/HST (goods and services tax;
harmonized sales tax).   All persons aged 18 and over are eligible for benefits, depending
on the income of the person and spouse (if any).
•   Universal entitlement: Yes
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Provincial Tax Credits
 Program description
This is not actually a program but a category for various income amounts.  Included are
refundable tax credits other than those for children (which are included with child tax
benefits) and the GST/HST Credit.  Some are designed to help low-income individuals
and families to pay property taxes, education taxes, rent and living expenses, and so on.
Some non-taxable government transfers are not included here due to the reporting
procedures for income tax purposes (or lack thereof).  These include some training
program payments, Veteran’s pensions, pensions to the disabled (which are not part of
CPP/QPP payments), payments from provincial automobile insurance plans, and benefits
for fishing industry employees (outside of that provided in EI payments).
•   Universal entitlement: Yes
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSP)
 Program description
This is a private retirement savings plan that a person establishes and contributes to, and
that is registered with the federal government. Limits are established for the maximum
amount that one can contribute each year, based on earnings and amounts contributed to
any employer pension plans.  Provisions exist for some carry-forward of contribution
amounts from another year.  Any income earned in the RRSP is generally exempt from
tax until payments are received from the plan. A person may also elect to use available
RRSP contribution limits to contribute to his or her spouse's RRSP.  When a RRSP
matures, one must either reinvest in another RRSP-eligible investment, cash in the RRSP
(and pay income tax in that year on the money received) or use the money in the plan to
buy:
  an annuity for life;
  an annuity spread over a number of years; or
  a registered retirement income fund (RRIF).
One cannot hold an RRSP past the end of the year in which he/she turns age 69.
•   Universal entitlement: Yes
•   Means tested: No20
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Registered Retirement Income Funds (RRIF)
 Program description
Registered with the federal government, this private type of fund is a complement to the
RRSP. Normally, a person accumulates savings tax-free in an RRSP, then buys a RRIF
from which payments are made.  RRIF payments are taxable income.  Money is
transferred to a RRIF from a RRSP, RPP (registered pension plan from an employer), or
from another RRIF, and regular payments are made to the person holding the RRIF.  A
minimum amount must be paid annually from a RRIF after the year in which it is set up.
•   Universal entitlement: Yes
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes21
GOVERNMENT TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN GREAT BRITAIN
1
This document describes income sources in the BHPS.  The primary purpose of the document is
to provide a thumbnail sketch of government transfer programs in Great Britain.  Government
transfers being defined to include traditional programs in which those meeting specific
conditions receive money as well as programs related to private retirement income plans.  We
generally divide transfer income into two categories: income that flows from public insurance-
based benefits and income that flows from public welfare-based benefits.  We categorize income
from each program by whether it is a universal entitlement, whether the amount a person
receives is income or wealth means tested and whether there is a quid pro quo attached to receipt
of the income.  By “quid pro quo” we mean that the benefits are conditioned on having paid into
the system and the level of benefits are based to some degree on the level of past earnings.
National Insurance Retirement Pension
                                                          
1 This Summary was prepared with the assistance of Stephen Jenkins and Richard Berthoud of Essex University.
  Program description
This program provides state retirement benefits to those workers (or the spouse of a worker) with
qualifying earnings relating to Class 1 contributions equal to at least 25 times the weekly Lower
Earnings Limit in one of the two tax years on which the applicant’s claim is based.  Benefits are
available at age 60 for women and at age 65 for men.  The pension age of women will be
incrementally raised to age 65 over the period 2010 to 2020.
•   Universal entitlement:  No
•   Means tested:  No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”:  Yes
Widow or war widows pension
 Program description
This National Insurance program extends benefits to widows of workers who have had (since
April 6, 1975) qualifying earnings of at least 25 time the Lower Earnings Limit for the year in
which earnings accrued or have paid 25 flat-rate contributions before April 6, 1975.
•   Universal entitlement:  No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Widowed mothers allowance
 Program description22
This National Insurance program extends benefits to widows of employees, directors of
companies, self-employed and workers making voluntary contributions if the workers have
contributed the qualifying amount from earnings for minimum contributions in their respective
class or if they have paid 50 flat-rate contributions before April 6, 1975.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Invalidity pension
 Program description
The purpose of this program is to replace earnings of those incapable of work.  Recipients must
have had previously paid national insurance contributions.  In 1995 benefits from this program
were renamed as “Incapacity benefits.”
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Severe disablement allowance
 Program description
The purpose of this program is to replace earnings of those incapable of work and who have not
previously paid national insurance contributions.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Industrial injury allowance
 Program description
The purpose of this program is to compensate people who were injured or became sick in the
course of employment.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Attendance allowance
 Program description23
This program is designed to meet the extra costs of caring for disabled persons over the age of 65
who have special needs.  This program extends the care component of the Disability Living
Allowance program to persons age 65 or older.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Mobility allowance
 Program description
This benefit is the mobility component of the Disability Living Allowance.  That program is
designed to meet the extra costs of disabled people with special needs for care or mobility.  Can
be claimed only up to age 65.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Invalid care allowance
 Program description
The purpose of this program is to replace earnings for those who do not work because they are
caring for a disabled person receiving the Disability Living Allowance or the Attendance
Allowance.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
War disability pension
 Program description
The purpose of this program is to compensate people who were injured or became sick while
serving in the armed forces.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Disability working allowance
 Program description
This program is designed to supplement low pay of those working at least 16 hours per week.
The benefit is restricted to workers whose employment prospects are affected by disability.
•   Universal entitlement: No24
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Disability living allowance
 Program description
This program is designed to meet the extra costs of disabled people with special needs for care
or mobility.  Can be claimed only up to age 65.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: Yes




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:
•   Requires “quid pro quo”:
Income support
 Program description
The purpose of this program is to maintain a minimum level of income for non working
claimants and their dependents.  Benefits above the basic rates are available to disabled persons
(“disability premium”).  Before 1988 this benefit was called the “Supplementary benefit.”
•   Universal entitlement: Yes
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
National Insurance sickness benefit
 Program description
[To be inserted]
•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:





•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:
•   Requires “quid pro quo”:
Housing benefit and council tax benefit
 Program description
This program subsidizes the payment of rent and council tax liabilities of claimants and
dependents.  Higher subsidies are available to disabled persons (a disability premium).
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No26
GOVERNMENT TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN GERMANY
This document describes income sources in the GSOEP.  The primary purpose of the document
is to provide a thumbnail sketch of government transfer programs in Germany.  Government
transfers are defined to include traditional programs in which recipients must satisfy specific
conditions to receive money and programs that transfer money to a specific group with no other
condition attached.  We also describe sources of private pension income and other transfer
income from private sources.  We generally divide public transfer income into two categories:
income that flows from public insurance-based benefits and income that flows from public
welfare-based benefits.  We categorize income from each program by whether it is a universal
entitlement, whether the amount a person receives is income or wealth means tested and whether
there is a quid pro quo attached to receipt of the income.  By “quid pro quo” we mean that the
benefits are conditioned on having paid into the system and the level of benefits are based to
some degree on the level of past earnings.
Old-age pensions
  Program description
[To be added]
•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:
•   Requires “quid pro quo”:
Supplementary civil servant pension
 Program description
[To be added]29
•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:




•   Universal entitlement:
•   Means tested:
•   Requires “quid pro quo”:30
GOVERNMENT TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES
This document describes government transfer programs in the United States, with government
transfers being defined to include traditional programs in which recipients must satisfy specific
conditions to receive money and programs related to private retirement income plans.  We
generally divide transfer income into two categories: income that flows from public insurance-
based benefits and income that flows from public welfare-based benefits.  We categorize income
from each program by whether it is a universal entitlement, whether the amount a person
receives is income or wealth means tested and whether there is a quid pro quo attached to receipt
of the income.  By “quid pro quo” we mean that the benefits are conditioned on having paid into
the system and the level of benefits are based to some degree on the level of past earnings.
Old-Age Insurance
Program description
The Old-Age Insurance (OAI) program provides a monthly pension benefit based on past
earnings to workers and their spouses age 62 and older.  To be eligible for benefits the worker
must have contributed into the system for a fixed number of years.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Disability Insurance
 Program description
The Disability Insurance (DI) program provides a monthly pension benefit based on past
earnings to those who are determined to be unable to perform any gainful activity. At age 65 all
beneficiaries are automatically shifted to the Old-Age Insurance program.  To be eligible for
benefits a worker must have recently contributed into the system for a fixed number of years.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Survivors Insurance
 Program description
The Survivors Insurance (SI) program provides a monthly benefit to the survivors (spouse and
dependent children) of a deceased worker who was covered by the Old-Age and Disability
Insurance programs.  Benefits are based on the past earnings of the worker.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No31
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Unemployment Insurance (UI)
 Program description
Unemployment insurance provides benefits to regularly employed workers who become
involuntarily unemployed and who are able and willing to accept suitable employment.  The
precise rules governing UI varies by state.  In most states benefits are designed to replace about
50 percent of usual weekly wages subject to a maximum.  Benefits typically last a statutory
maximum of 26 weeks.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Workers Compensation (WC)
 Program description
Workers compensation provides benefits to regularly employed workers who become
involuntarily unemployed through work-related accidents. The precise rules governing WC vary
by state.  In most states benefits are designed to replace a fraction of usual weekly wages subject
to a maximum. The fraction and maximum vary by state.  Depending on the type and nature of
the injury, a worker can be classified as having a permanent or temporary disability and that
disability can be classified as either full or partial.  The duration and amount of benefits vary
with the classification of the disability.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Veterans Benefits
 Program description
Veterans Benefits includes two programs that provide cash benefits. The first program provides
benefits to veterans with service-connected disabilities.  This program is similar in design to WC.
A second program provides benefits to needy veterans who have non service connected
disabilities.  This program is similar in design to SSI.
Compensation for service connected disabilities
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: No
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Pensions for non service connected disabilities
•   Universal entitlement: No32
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: Yes
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)/Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF)
 Program description
TANF replace AFDC effective in July 1997.  TANF provides assistance and work opportunities
to low-income families with children.  Families can spend more than five cumulative years on
TANF.  States have broad flexibility to determine eligibility, methods of assistance and benefit
levels.  In all state, nearly all recipients must work after having received two years of assistance.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
 Program description
Supplemental Security Income provides income support to persons 65 and older, blind or
disabled adults, or blind or disabled children.  Eligibility requirements and payment standards are
nationally uniform.  The disability requirement for SSI is the same as for DI.  Benefit levels are
based on an income test and an asset test.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Food Stamps
 Program description
The Food Stamp program provides electronic benefit transfer payments that are accepted at most
retail food stores.  To qualify for benefits households must meet income and asset tests.
•   Universal entitlement: Yes
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Work and Training Programs
 Program description
The Federal government has at times created specific jobs targeted to members of low-income
households.  An example of these types of programs would be the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act of 1973 (CETA).  This program ended in the early 1980s.  Since the early33
1980s, work-related programs have almost completely shifted to short-run training activities.
Examples of this would be the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982.  In general, to remain
eligible for income transfers from programs like TANF and Food Stamps recipients are expected
to enter job training programs.
•   Universal entitlement: Yes
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Women with Infant Children (WIC)
 Program description
WIC is a special supplemental food program that provides food assistance to low-income
pregnant and post-partum women and their infants as well as to low-income children up to the
age of five.  Benefits are income and asset tested.
•   Universal entitlement: Yes
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Public Assistance
 Program description
General Assistance is provided by state and local jurisdictions.  Eligibility requirements and
payments vary from state to state and often within a state.  Payment levels are usually lower than
those provided by federally financed programs and are often of limited duration.  Recipients
generally include unemployed persons not currently eligible for UI and persons whose
disabilities are not sufficiently severe to qualify for SSI.
•   Universal entitlement: No
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program
 Program description
Provides benefits to eligible households to meet the cost of home energy.  Benefits are income
and asset tested.
•   Universal entitlement: Yes
•   Means tested: Yes
•   Requires “quid pro quo”: No
Retirement, pension and annuity income
 Description34
Employer pensions are generally either defined contribution plans or defined benefit plans.
Defined contribution plans are generally financed by explicit contributions from both the
employer and employee.  These funds are then invested.  Benefits depend on the outcome of
these investments.  Defined benefit plans provide a specific benefit based on past earnings.
Veterans Pension
 Description
Veterans pension provide defined benefit pension income for military service.  To be eligible a
veteran must has served a fixed number of years.
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA)/401K plans
 Description




This category includes income from court imposed and voluntary payments from the non-
resident parent to the parent who provides care to the child.
Help from relatives
 Description
This category includes income from non-resident relatives.
Other transfer income
 Description
This category includes income from any other non-resident sources.1
Endnotes
1.  We treat death as a special case of labor market exit.  We analyze the sample of men and
women who die separately from those who exit the labor market while still alive.
2.   In this paper we use the term social security programs to refer to public, industry-wide,
insurance-based retirement, disability, and survivors programs where benefits are based on
the worker’s earnings record.  In some countries, social security programs could also include
unemployment insurance, child benefits, etc.
3.    Some studies employ a synthetic cohort approach using repeated cross-sections to show how
income changes across age groups.  Such methods may be confounded composition and age
effects.
4.     Because the Canadian panel is much shorter, we only require two consecutive years of work
followed by two years of non-employment.
5.    Although data for Canada are only publicly available for 1993-1994, SLID data from 1995-
1998 can be analyzed by special arrangement with Statistics Canada. To inquire about
access to any of the data in this paper contact Dean Lillard at DRL3@cornell.edu.  We thank
Phil Giles of Statistic Canada for assisting us on this paper.
6.    Though data on the residents of the eastern states of Germany are available starting in 1990,
we restrict our German sample to men with five years of continuous residence in the western
states of Germany.
7.    Very few men experienced more than one labor market exit over the period of our data.
8.   Year of death is identified using the public use files of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
1977-1993.  In the next draft of this paper we will substantially increase our sample of
households in which the head or spouse died because we have received permission to use a
file of the PSID that identifies the date and cause of all PSID sample members who have
died.  The use of this file, known as the PSID Death File, is restricted.
9.  The sources of income in each of these categories are described in more detail in Appendix
Table 1A.
10.   Because we are interested in both labor market exit and changes in economic well-being by
age we use a yearly frame for both definitions.  Age is reported at the time of the interview
but we are measuring employment and household income in the previous year.  Because our
data are based on the year and not actually on the day of exit we will not precisely capture
income flows before and after the day of labor market exit.  This is why we focus on the
years prior to and after exit and do not include the actual year of exit in our tables.
11.    All observations in our sample are weighted.  Longitudinal weights of the last year of work
(t) are assigned.  These weights make the sample representative of the population born in the2
range of years consistent with each age group and sample period. For example, in the PSID
our sample period is from 1990 to 1996.  Our sample weights in the PSID makes the 25-49
year-old sample representative of men born between 1941 and 1971 who exited the labor
force sometime between 1990 and 1996.  The sample weights in the other data sets and age
groups yield samples that represent populations similarly defined.
12.    GSOEP, PSID and SLID data are collected on labor earnings and labor force participation
in the preceding calendar year.  BHPS data on labor earnings and labor force participation
are for September 1 of the previous year to September 1 of the current (survey) year.  To be
in our sample a worker must have experienced his last year of work no earlier than 1990.  In
tables showing income for up to three years prior to exit, we use PSID and GSOEP data
from income years 1987-1989 for those who last worked in 1990.  Note also that we use
unbalanced panels in these tables.
13.   We focus on men aged 55 to 67 in Figure 1 because these are the ages at which the hazard of
a long-term labor market exit rises substantially in all four countries.  In tables available
from the authors we show that at earlier ages exit rates are modest (less than 5 percent in
each country) and there is little difference in these rates across the four countries.  We do not
present or plot values at ages with fewer than 35 men.
14.    The conceptualization of a worker’s pension and social security rights as an asset whose
value varies over his or her life cycle is an important innovation in the retirement literature.
See Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990) for an early use and review of this
conceptualization and its importance in modeling retirement decisions and Quinn and
Burkhauser (1998) and Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) for more recent reviews.
15.    See Borsch-Supan and Schnable (1999) for Germany, Diamond and Gruber (1999) for the
United States, Blundell and Johnson (1999) for Great Britain, and Gruber (1999) for Canada
for a discussion of the behavioral impact of social security programs on retirement in these
countries.
16.  Income is non-zero in t+1 and t+2 because men who work no more than 52 hours per year
are considered to have effectively left the labor force even if they have positive labor
earnings.  However, in Great Britain, the differences in the time unit for yearly income may
also play a role at younger ages.
17.     The United States eligibility criteria for disability benefits is among the strictest in industrial
countries – inability to perform any substantial gainful activity – and social security
beneficiaries per 1000 workers are lower in the United States than in Great Britain or
Germany.  See Aarts, Burkhauser and de Jong (1998) for a fuller discussion.
18.     A worker’s retirement benefit is based on an average of the worker’s lifetime earnings
(AIME).  Over the period we analyze, a full benefit was paid to those who requested benefits
at age 65.  The benefit is the worker’s primary insurance amount (PIA).  For married workers,
a spouse benefit is provided which equals 50 percent of the worker’s PIA.  At the death of the
worker or the spouse, the survivor receives only the PIA amount.  Hence a survivor’s total3
social security benefit would equal 67 percent of the benefit paid to the worker and spouse
while both were alive.  This ratio can fall as low as 50 percent in the case when a head and
spouse have identical earnings histories.  But for those who died at age 70 or older in this time
period, most wives had much lower AIME than their husbands and hence were more likely to
receive the husband’s PIA as their survivor benefit rather than continuing to receive their own






























































































Source: authors' calculations based on PSID 1977-1993
Replacement rate defined as size-adjusted net-of-tax household income in year t+1 divided by 











































































Source: authors' calculations based on PSID 1977-1993
Replacement rate defined as size-adjusted net-of-tax household income in year t+1 divided by size-adjusted net-of-tax household 









































Source: authors' calculations based on PSID 1977-1993
Replacement rate defined as size-adjusted household social security income in year t+1 divided 
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Replacement rate defined as size-adjusted household social security income in year t+1 divided by size-adjusted  household social 









Before After Before After Before After Before After
Income Source Aged 25 through 49
Own market work 23172 516 36255 1468 14384 2704 22781 1495
Private pensions 1958 2186 142 567 173 854 492 1251
Other private 21760 17741 19358 22202 7831 14084 13095 18100
Social security 2507 1287 939 2723 330 816 344 778
Other public 1086 1601 2104 11318 1868 5603 816 5143
Post-government 46481 22463 43179 32037 19174 16647 35901 28721
Aged 50 through 61
Own market work 47830 1118 64213 4110 17125 236 40212 3372
Private pensions 2948 13515 58 3526 1136 5705 1481 13898
Other private 36808 28623 33782 29685 12182 17203 24338 31690
Social security 1046 3347 1271 18061 1130 1639 203 681
Other public 710 610 922 8248 1456 4165 1189 5224
Post-government 78455 46613 71311 55813 27185 20930 55093 40860
Aged 62 and over
Own market work 30339 514 57319 172 13604 130 27656 1941
Private pensions 4856 9304 55 3192 3515 3855 2199 8281
Other private 24670 15008 29655 19266 12419 14863 11943 15392
Social security 4105 9863 6464 31302 2401 5452 804 6568
Other public 189 271 264 1201 2352 6100 397 1034
Post-government 58756 34571 71030 52073 25630 18087 40710 33664
Source: PSID income years 1988-1996, GSOEP income years 1988-1997, BHPS income years 1990-1997, SLID income years 1993-
1998.  Sample sizes for men aged 25-49, 50-61 and 62 and over respectively are:  PSID (209, 85, 86), GSOEP (94, 241, 72), BHPS
(49, 78, 48), and SLID (134, 179, 83).
Notes:  Household income is averaged over years t-2 and t-1 (before) and over years t+1 and t+2 (after), where (t) is the last year of
long-term employment.  Income values are in constant 1996 United States dollars, 1995 German marks, 1996 British pounds, and
1997 Canadian dollars.Table 2.  Median Private Pension, Social Security and Total Income Replacement Rates of Men, by Country and Age of Exit
(Percentages)
Age 25 through 49 Age 50 through 61 Age 62 and over
Social Private Total Social Private Total Social Private Total
Country Security Pensions Income Security Pensions Income Security Pensions Income
United States 0.0 0.0 46.0 0.0 28.7 62.0 35.0 25.3 52.2
Germany 0.0 0.0 58.2 28.7 0.0 76.8 55.8 0.0 76.9
Great Britain 0.0 0.0 86.0 5.7 25.3 74.9 57.0 14.6 75.0
Canada 0.0 0.0 75.9 0.0 20.5 71.3 28.3 19.6 84.2
Source:  PSID Income years 1988-1996 GSOEP Income years 1988-1997 BHPS Income years 1990-1997 SLID Income years 1993-
1998
Notes:  The social security earnings replacement rate is the ratio of household social security income to own labor income.  The
private pension earnings replacement rate is the ratio of household private pension income to own labor earnings.  The total income
replacement rate is the ratio of post-government household income after and before labor force exit.  In all cases, income before labor
force exit is averaged over years t-1 and t-2.  Income after labor force exit is averaged over years t+1 and t+2.  The median value of
each is reported in the cells of this table .  The actual median person is different in each cell.Table 2A.  Widow’s Household In come and its Sources Before and After Husband’s Death
(1996 dollars)
Aged 25-49
Income Source t-3 t-2 t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
Private Sources
Total Household Labor Income 65302 59811 60738 24014 23470 22729
    Survivor's Labor Income 17303 15096 15294 20152 17677 16614
    Deceased's Labor Income 45309 40648 41312 0 0 0
    Others' Labor Income 2691 4067 4132 3862 5793 6114
Private Transfers 81 2562 84 7 0 106
Private Pensions 0 0 0 637 0 1089
Imputed Rents 4639 5163 3720 5308 4413 4255
Assets 5781 3656 2294 10386 14214 12904
Public Sources
Transfers 230 204 1050 115 30 0
Social Security 1174 1164 1272 5049 4436 2641
Taxes 18694 15824 16105 6357 8057 6950
Net-of-tax Household Income 58511 56737 53053 31219 35455 33996
Aged 50-61
Income Source t-3 t-2 t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
Private Sources
Total Household Labor Income 55474 57440 55319 22144 21273 21406
    Survivor's Labor Income 14405 13600 14466 13870 14649 15304
    Deceased's Labor Income 31867 32565 31424 0 0 0
    Others' Labor Income 9202 11275 9429 8274 6624 6103
Private Transfers 302 245 13 29 413 171
Private Pensions 4674 4055 4470 5666 4985 5145
Imputed Rents 4866 4925 4386 4523 4540 4473
Assets 5441 4640 4129 7357 12760 4333
Public Sources
Transfers 577 1117 581 299 473 410
Social Security 2282 2396 2955 2487 2943 2495
Taxes 15714 15936 15943 7313 8454 5998
Net-of-tax Household Income 57902 58883 55910 34544 38893 32409
Aged 62-69
Income Source t-3 t-2 t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
Private Sources
Total Household Labor Income 33393 29549 23121 9271 8427 8689
    Survivor's Labor Income 10435 9177 8729 4779 4566 5228
    Deceased's Labor Income 20302 17483 11435 0 0 0
    Others' Labor Income 2656 2889 2957 4492 3861 3462
Private Transfers 4 101 -232 111 41 135
Private Pensions 4912 4733 9368 6320 4774 5794Imputed Rents 4952 5000 4872 5583 5156 5785
Assets 3277 3135 4482 3942 6370 6746
Public Sources
Transfers 436 406 291 464 320 283
Social Security 6080 7482 10291 7598 8133 8207
Taxes 9630 8672 8204 3305 3168 4345
Net-of-tax Household Income 43230 41678 43989 29957 28548 25891
Aged 70+
Income Source t-3 t-2 t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
Private Sources
Total Household Labor Income 12365 10513 4312 2253 6116 1807
    Survivor's Labor Income 1197 1057 1222 854 703 457
    Deceased's Labor Income 3688 2104 987 0 0 0
    Others' Labor Income 7481 7352 2103 1399 5413 1350
Private Transfers 205 88 141 89 248 83
Private Pensions 4782 5024 4596 1609 2083 1870
Imputed Rents 4593 4654 4342 3229 3227 3391
Assets 16212 15686 12005 7276 12302 9655
Public Sources
Transfers 121 144 148 146 369 101
Social Security 13368 13285 13248 8370 8592 8617
Taxes 6449 5082 3026 1395 3507 1897
Net-of-tax Household Income 44929 44314 35766 20425 27578 19873
Source: authors' calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1976-1993
Notes:
1.  This is an unbalanced panel.  Sample size varies across years.  Sample sizes for those aged
25-49, 50-61, 62-69, and 70 and older respectively are 27-48, 47-84, 46-95, 77-183.
2.  A detailed list of the income types included in each category is in the appendix.Table 3. Survivor’ Mean Household Income and its Sources Before and After Death of
Household Head Spouse (1996 dollars)
Aged 25-49
Income Source t-3 t-2 t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
Private Sources
Total Household Labor Income 60431 62754 61443 42907 43738 33912
    Survivor's Labor Income 29291 31063 30210 34315 33495 24050
    Deceased's Labor Income 29553 28384 27399000
    Others' Labor Income 1587 3307 3835 8592 10242 9862
Private Transfers 128 1736 486 306 258 45
Private Pensions 160 394 141 359 517 462
Imputed Rents 4292 4118 3895 5980 4638 4089
Assets 3108 2160 1672 4767 7055 6464
Public Sources
Transfers 119 155 525 54 68 203
Social Security 3678 3600 2960 4844 4411 3244
Taxes 17928 16912 16250 12349 13478 9172
Net-of-tax Household Income 53073 58004 54873 44219 46872 38760
Aged 50-61
Income Source t-3 t-2 t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
Private Sources
Total Household Labor Income 53800 50470 48507 27236 26614 25868
    Survivor's Labor Income 21821 16874 17202 16388 19368 18039
    Deceased's Labor Income 23179 23927 23148000
    Others' Labor Income 8799 9668 8157 10848 7247 7829
Private Transfers 235 299 38 363 323 133
Private Pensions 3633 4040 4526 4995 4384 5271
Imputed Rents 4721 4699 4319 4440 4455 4433
Assets 4655 4172 3466 10139 11537 6215
Public Sources
Transfers 750 989 633 268 510 354
Social Security 1827 2074 2615 3299 3544 3606
Taxes 14839 13638 13514 9278 10177 8184
Net-of-tax Household Income 54781 53106 50591 40763 40477 37065
Aged 62-69
Income Source t-3 t-2 t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
Private Sources
Total Household Labor Income 27402 23038 20635 9977 8951 8034    Survivor's Labor Income 9866 7886 8618 4792 4550 4573
    Deceased's Labor Income 14699 12510 9166000
    Others' Labor Income 2837 2642 2850 5185 4401 3461
Private Transfers 10 165 -157 79 32 92
Private Pensions 5992 5210 8335 5524 4761 5168
Imputed Rents 5511 5462 5350 5394 5018 5526
Assets 3470 3397 4314 5071 6012 7117
Public Sources
Transfers 423 317 289 354 239 215
Social Security 6989 8606 10653 8184 8661 8890
Taxes 7784 6523 7258 3141 3497 3884
Net-of-tax Household Income 41818 39621 42160 31422 28111 26394
Aged 70+
Income Source t-3 t-2 t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
Private Sources
Total Household Labor Income 10874 9132 3988 1997 5243 1788
    Survivor's Labor Income 1653 1294 1074 705 758 359
    Deceased's Labor Income 2843 1654 767000
    Others' Labor Income 6378 6184 2147 1291 4485 1430
Private Transfers 179 75 116 70 211 77
Private Pensions 4597 4546 4198 2010 2574 2219
Imputed Rents 4497 4372 4169 3426 3239 3534
Assets 13478 13704 11094 7348 11176 9818
Public Sources
Transfers 242 224 147 123 298 193
Social Security 13407 13369 13291 8477 8360 8519
Taxes 5268 4275 2724 1412 3236 1885
Net-of-tax Household Income 41814 41147 34278 20143 24643 19244
Source: authors' calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1976-1993
Notes:
1.  This is an unbalanced panel.  Sample size varies across years.  Sample sizes for those aged
25-49, 50-61, 62-69, and 70 and older respectively are 52-81, 82-121, 77-131, 119-234.
2.  A detailed list of the income types included in each category is in the appendix.Table 3 A.  Widow’s Mean Net-of-Tax Household Size-Adjusted Income Before and After Husband’s Death by Various Returns-to-
Scale Values (1996)
Aged 25-49 Aged 50-61 Aged 62-69 Aged 70+
Equivalence Scale Value t-1 t+1 t-1 t+1 t-1 t+1 t-1 t+1
e=0 53053 31219 55910 34544 43989 29957 35766 20425
e=.5 30644 23445 34253 27764 29532 27558 24898 19332
e=1 18115 18855 21784 23663 20019 25884 17396 18639
Family size 3.3 2.1 3.0 1.7 2.3 1.3 2.1 1.2
Source: authors' calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1976-1993
Notes:  This is an unbalanced panel.  Sample size varies across years.Table 4.  Survivor’s Mean Net-of Tax Household Size-Adjusted Income Before and After Death of a Household Head or Spouse, by
Various Returns-to-Scale Values (1996 dollars)
Aged 25-49 Aged 50-61 Aged 62-69 Aged 70+
Equivalence Scale Values t-1 t+1 t-1 t+1 t-1 t+1 t-1 t+1
e=0 54873 44219 50591 40763 42160 31422 34278 20143
e=.5 30936 33098 31143 34407 28557 29210 23773 19214
e=1 17868 26161 19816 30469 19504 27703 16571 18627
Family size 3.4 2.1 2.9 1.6 2.3 1.3 2.1 1.2
Source: authors' calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1976-1993
Notes:  This is an unbalanced panel.  Sample size varies across yeAppendix Table 1A.  Definitions and Detailed Listing of Components of Income Categories.




-net income of farm owners-
operators












-75% of positive farm income
-75% of business income
-reported earnings of self-
employed
  Own Labor earnings of the person who exited the labor force (while still living)
  Others' Labor earnings of all other household members
  Survivor Labor earnings of the surviving spouse or eldest next-of-kin
  Deceased Labor earnings of the deceased
Private transfers Income of all household members
from:
-alimony and child support
(including court-ordered)
-other taxable transfer income
Income from persons not in the
household in the previous year








-non resident family members









Retirement Savings Plans (RRSP)
-withdrawals from Registered
Retirement Income Funds (RRIF)
Income of all household
members from:
-Supplementary pensions for
public sector employees (not
civil servants)
-Company pensions
-all other pension income




-pensions from spouse's ex-
employer
-private pension or annuity





-annuity incomeAppendix Table 1A.  Continued
Income Category Canada Germany Great Britain United States
Imputed rents Equals 6 percent of the net equity ownership of a household's residence (not available in SLID)








-Rent (minus operating and
maintenance costs)
Income of all household
members from:
-Interest, dividends, annuities
-Rent from boarders or lodgers
-Rent from any other property
The sum of income of the head
and wife's:
-asset portion of farm income
-asset portion of income from
unincorporated business
-asset portion of income from
farming or market gardening
-asset portion of income from
roomers
-rent,
and income of all household
members from:
-dividends, interest, trust funds,
and royalties
Public sources







Income of all household


















-widow or war widows pension
-widowed mothers allowance
-Invalidity pension




-Survivors InsuranceAppendix Table 1A.  Continued
Income Category Canada Germany Great Britain United States
Public transfers Income of all household members
from:




-Goods and Services Tax Credit
-Provincial Tax Credits










-Support for the care of sick
family members
-Nursing home allowance

































-Aid to Families with
Dependent Children
(AFDC)/Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families (TANF)
-Supplemental Security Income
(SSI)
-Bonus value of Food Stamps
-Other welfare incomeAppendix Table 1A.  Continued
Income Category Canada Germany Great Britain United States








-The sum of annual individual
taxes for all household
members
-Annual solidarity surplus tax
Estimated total household
taxes, including:












Income Sum of all income components - taxes
Sources: The Cross-National Equivalent File Codebook 1980-1998, Panel Study of Income Dynamics Users Manuals 1980-1997,
British Household Panel Survey User Manual Volumes A-H, German Socio-Economic Panel SOEPINFO 1984-1998, Codebook
prepared for Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics portion of Cross-National Equivalent File Codebook, 1998.